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I. INTRODUCTION
When libel law conflicts with the First Amendment, the United
States Supreme Court has held that the measure of protection re-
ceived by the press depends primarily on whether the plaintiff is a
public or private person.' This Article questions whether this "public
figure doctrine"2 is, or should become, part of the constitutional test
applied to tort actions for invasion of privacy.3 This inquiry is made
more urgent by the willingness of at least two members of the current
Supreme Court, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,4 to incorporate the public fig-
ure doctrine into constitutional privacy law.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the rise of the public figure
doctrine in constitutional libel law. Part III examines the limited use
of the public figure doctrine in privacy law prior to the Court's decision
in Bartnicki. The Court repeatedly seemed to reject a plaintiffs pub-
lic/private status as part of the constitutional analysis in privacy
cases. However, Part III notes that the common law of privacy has
always embraced the public/private figure distinction and that the
Court has used the doctrine in a related area-the individual's right of
informational privacy against the government. 5
It was against this background that the Court decided Bartnicki.6
Part IV sets out the conflicting views of the Justices in the 2001 deci-
1. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. Technically the doctrine to which I refer should be called the "public figure and
public official doctrine," since it covers both public figures and public officials.
For simplicity's sake, I will shorten it to the "public figure doctrine."
3. I use the term "tort actions for invasion of privacy" to refer to tort actions seeking
damages for the publication of private information by the press. Such actions
include both the common-law torts of false light and public disclosure of private
facts, recognized by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976); actions
created by statute, such as the damages claim created by the wiretapping stat-
utes considered in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); and negligence per se
claims such as that at issue in Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). I do
not cover privacy claims that do not focus on publication (such as physical intru-
sion), or those that focus on the commercial value, rather than the private nature,
of the information (such as trade secret or misappropriation actions).
4. 532 U.S. 514, 535-41 (2001) (Breyer, J., joined by O'Connor, J., concurring).
5. See infra Part 1II.
6. 532 U.S. 514.
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sion and explores Justice Breyer's view that a plaintiffs status (as a
public or private person) is a core component of the test for constitu-
tional protection in privacy cases. This Article argues that Justice
Breyer's approach is a multifactored, ad hoc, balancing analysis that
is dramatically different, and in many ways, inferior, to its libel law
cousin.
Part V questions the future of the public figure doctrine after Bart-
nicki, and predicts that a person's status will become part of constitu-
tional privacy law. However, this Article suggests that, if the Court is
going to transplant a public figure doctrine into constitutional privacy
law, it should adopt a doctrine based on definitional balancing, akin to
that currently in libel law, and reject Justice Breyer's ad hoc
approach.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBEL LAW
When a unanimous Supreme Court revolutionized common-law li-
bel in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 it adopted a test for constitu-
tional protection that turned on both the status of the plaintiff (as a
"public official") and the content of the offending speech (criticism of
"official conduct"). 8 In the decade that followed, the Court splintered.
In 1971, a majority of Justices held that the level of constitutional pro-
tection should turn on the content of the speech alone, and advocated
a "matter of public concern" test.9 Yet in 1974, the Court in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 10 reversed itself and declared that the status of the
plaintiff (as a private or public person), not the content of the speech,
should dictate the level of protection."'
Since Gertz, the Court has consistently predicated its constitu-
tional analysis in libel cases on the status of the plaintiff. While ques-
tions as to the content of speech have crept back in at various points of
the analysis, 12 it remains true that in libel law, the public figure doc-
trine is the dominant canon. Indeed, the Court has created a detailed
jurisprudence defining public persons, a term I use to include both
public officials (who acquire their public status due to their "responsi-
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. Id. at 279-80.
9. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). The Court has used varying
language, including matter of public concern, of public interest and of public sig-
nificance. This Article treats these terms as synonymous.
10. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11. Id. at 348.
12. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
755-63 (1985) (holding that in private figure cases, the level of protection varies
on whether the matter is one of public or private concern).
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bility for or control over the conduct of government affairs"), 13 and
public figures (who acquire public status by taking on a role of "espe-
cial prominence" or by thrusting themselves into an ongoing debate). 14
The public figure doctrine posits that, while the State has a strong
interest in providing a tort remedy to private persons who are libeled,
the State has a much weaker interest in providing a remedy to public
officials and public figures. 15 First, the Court has posited that public
plaintiffs have less need for a legal remedy because they can often en-
gage in self-help, using their access to the media to rebut alleged li-
bels. 16 Since such public persons can help themselves, the State has a
lesser interest in providing a tort remedy.17 In contrast, the State has
a far greater interest in providing a remedy for private figures, since,
lacking access to the media, they must rely on tort law as the only
avenue to rebut false statements. 18
The Court has also theorized that public persons are less deserving
of recovery because they assume the risk of injury to their reputations
when they enter the public sphere. 19 Public plaintiffs "must accept
certain necessary consequences" of involvement in public affairs, in-
cluding the risk of false and defamatory criticism. 20 By voluntarily
taking on public employment or prominent roles in society, public per-
sons are presumed to have relinquished part of their interest in pro-
tecting their good names, and are, therefore, less "deserving of
recovery" than private plaintiffs. 2 1 Private persons, who have never
voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk of false publicity, have a far
greater claim to recovery. The Court has characterized this "assump-
13. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). The Court has made clear that not
everyone on the government's payroll is a public official, but it has held that, at
the "very least," it includes those with substantial control over public affairs. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of the Court's public/private person jurisprudence,
see Susan M. Gilles, From Baseball Parks to the Public Arena: Assumption of the
Risk in Tort Law and Constitutional Libel Law, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 231 (2002).
14. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. The Court has identified three types of public figures:
"all purpose public figures" whose "pervasive fame or notoriety" makes them pub-
lic figures in all contexts; "limited [purpose] public figures" whose decision to
"thrust themselves to the forefront of particular pubic controversies" subjects
them to public scrutiny on that issue; and the exceedingly rare "involuntary pub-
lic figure" who acquires public status "through no purposeful action of his own."
See Gilles, supra note 13, at 248-60 (discussing in detail the various types of
public plaintiffs and the tests used to identify them).
15. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-45. For a more detailed discussion of the Court's public
figure jurisprudence, see Gilles, supra note 13, at 237-60 (discussing the Court's
assumption-of-the-risk rationale).
16. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. The Court characterized self-help as the less impor-
tant of the two rationales. Id. at 344.
17. Id. at 344-45.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 345.
20. Id. at 344.
21. Id. at 345.
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tion of the risk" rationale as the more important basis for its public/
private person distinction.2 2
Because of public plaintiffs' lesser interest in recovery, the Court
has ruled that the First Amendment requires these plaintiffs not only
to prove injury to reputation and falsity, but also to produce clear and
convincing evidence that the press published the false report, knowing
it was false or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.23 This
rigorous fault standard, known as "actual malice,"2 4 prevents the
overwhelming number of public plaintiffs from recovering.2 5 Indeed,
one author has labeled actual malice an "insurmountable barrier" to
recovery. 26 In contrast, those deemed "private" plaintiffs, even when
involved in a matter of public concern, usually have to prove only
negligence. 2 7
Thus, in libel law, the public figure doctrine is of immense signifi-
cance-it is a central strand in the Court's libel jurisprudence, and, as
a practical matter, it determines who wins and who loses most libel
suits.
III. THE CONFLICTING TALE OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE
DOCTRINE IN PRIVACY CASES PRIOR TO BARTNICKI
A. The Absence of the Public Figure Doctrine from the
Court's Constitutional Analysis of Privacy Torts
In contrast to libel, when the Court considered the clash between
the First Amendment and the privacy torts of false light and disclo-
sure of true private facts,28 the Court did not employ the public/pri-
vate person distinction to determine the scope of constitutional
22. Id. at 344.
23. Id. at 346; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
24. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
25. One study estimated that just over eighty percent of defense motions for sum-
mary judgment based on plaintiffs' lack of evidence of actual malice were
granted; and in those cases where plaintiffs survived pretrial motions and recov-
ered at trial, appellate courts reversed pro-plaintiffjudgments for lack of proof of
actual malice in sixty-six percent of appealed cases. See Susan M. Gilles, Taking
First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1774-79 (1998) (reporting on the statistical findings of the
Libel Defense Resource Center and other researchers).
26. Nat Stem, Unresolved Antithesis of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 Hous.
L. REV. 1027, 1028 (1996). See also David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Re-
forming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488 (1991) (noting that "[miost victims of defa-
mation cannot meet the actual malice requirement").
27. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3.30 (2d ed.
1998) (discussing the various standards adopted by states after Gertz).
28. There are four common-law privacy torts; however only the two that punish the
publication of private information (false light and disclosure of true private facts)
are discussed in this Article. For the standard definition of these privacy torts,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1976).
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protection. The Court's first encounter with a privacy tort was in
Time, Inc. v. Hill,29 where the Court faced a statutory version of the
false light tort.30 False light is closely related to libel. It creates a
cause of action for the publication of false information, but it does not
require a showing of harm to reputation. Rather, it simply requires
that the plaintiff was placed in a "false light" that would be "highly
offensive to a reasonable person."3 1 Despite these similarities, the
Court declared that it would not copy the structure it had established
in the libel cases, but would instead assess anew the constitutional
test that should apply. 32 The divided Court then held that, where the
speech was on a matter of public concern, proof of actual malice was
constitutionally required.3 3 Content, not public figure status, seemed
to be the key to constitutional protection in false light privacy cases.3 4
29. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
30. For the standard definition of the false light tort, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E (1976):
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if: (a) the false light in which the other was
placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor
had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
At issue in Time, Inc., was an action for a false or fictitious report created by
statute. 385 U.S. at 376 n.1. While the statute, on its face, prohibited any com-
mercial use of another's name or image without written consent, the New York
courts had construed it to cover false speech. Id. at 383-84 (citing New York
caselaw). Thus the Supreme Court concluded that New York law gave an action
to a public or private person whose "name, picture, or portrait is the subject of a
fictitious report or article." Id. at 384-85.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. Comment b to that section discusses
the relationship between false light and libel. Id. at cmt. b. For an argument
that any similarity between the two torts is superficial, see Diane Leenheer Zim-
merman, False Light Invasion Of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 364, 393-95 (1989). The tort has not gained widespread acceptance. Id. at
451.
32. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 390-91. Some scholars have concluded that the Court did
in fact transpose its libel approach to false light. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra
note 31, at 385-86 (arguing that the Time, Inc. Court, without sufficient analysis,
transferred its actual malice standard of libel law to false light).
33. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 387-88.
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude
the application of the New York statute to redress false reports of mat-
ters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant pub-
lished the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth.
Id. The Court went on to give matters of public interest a wide construction,
concluding that it included entertainment as well as informational publications,
and covered every issue "about which information is needed or appropriate to
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Id. at
388 (citing Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
34. While the Time, Inc. Court did not adopt a private/public figure test, the majority
opinion was full of language discussing public figure status. The opinion has an
1209
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The result of Time, Inc. and the Court's refusal to adopt a public
figure test may be an accident of timing. Decided in 1967, before the
Court had mustered a majority in Gertz to endorse a private/public
person test,3 5 the decision may simply reflect the split on the Court at
that time.3 6 However, the Court has never disavowed Time, Inc.'s
holding, and indeed in its only other false light case, Cantrell v. Forest
City Publishing Co.,37 decided just after Gertz, the Court declined to
rule on whether Gertz altered the holding of Time, Inc.38 Given this
ambiguity, some lower courts continue to apply a public concern test
in false light cases as announced in Time, Inc., while others predict
that the Court will incorporate a public/private figure test.3 9 But at
extensive discussion of New York tort law that did distinguish between news-
worthy and non-newsworthy persons in some privacy cases. Thus, while New
York law precluded an action based on true information about newsworthy per-
sons and events, it did allow anyone, including newsworthy persons like the ap-
pellee, to recover for "fictionalization." The Court noted that the appellee (who
with his family was held hostage in his home by escaped convicts) was regarded
by the New York trial court as a "newsworthy person," thus barred from bringing
a true private facts action but permitted to bring a fictionalization claim. Id. at
386.
The issue of public figure status came up again, this time in a constitutional
context, after the Court announced its ruling. Arguing that its adoption of the
actual malice rule was "not through blind application of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan," the Time, Inc. Court refused to engage in a factual comparison be-
tween the two cases. Id. at 390. The Court made clear that it was not deciding
whether actual malice should apply to a libel action by private individuals (an
issue later resolved in Gertz), or on a statutory privacy action by a public official.
Id. at 390-91. The Court noted that the opportunities for self-help and assump-
tion of the risk of publicity might vary in such cases, but held that the question of
whether the same standard should apply to persons voluntarily and involuntarily
thrust into the public limelight was not before the Court. Id. at 391.
35. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
36. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTIUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
§ 11.3.5.3 (2d ed. 2002) (commenting that the Court has avoided the issue of
whether Time, Inc.'s use of a public concern test, rather than a public/private
figure test, remains good law or is simply a historical anachronism; and noting
that the lower courts are divided on this point).
37. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
38. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 250-51 (noting that the private figure plaintiff in that case
had proved actual malice, the Court indicated that it was not required to "con-
sider whether a State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of lia-
bility for a publisher or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private
individual under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or whether the consti-
tutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light
cases.").
39. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 36, at 1019 (noting a split in the lower courts). See also
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARK ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 158-59 (docu-
menting the split in lower courts); Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 392 n.173 (list-
ing cases which presume the public figure doctrine of libel law applies to the false
light tort).
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least to date, the Supreme Court has not adopted a person's status as
a component of the constitutional test in false light privacy cases.
The Court has also failed to use the public figure test in another
line of privacy cases, the disclosure of true private fact cases, where it
has instead created and repeatedly applied the "Daily Mail" test.4 0
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort as the publication
of a "matter concerning the private life of another," where the matter
publicized is "of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public."41 Thus,
it imposes liability for "publicity given to true statements of fact."4 2
The cases reaching the Court have typically concerned the press's rev-
elation of the names of rape victims and juvenile offenders in violation
of state statutes which prohibit such publication.4 3 The plaintiffs in
these cases sought money damages from the press for the publication
of true, yet very private, information.
The Court has consistently barred recovery, using the Daily Mail
test, which focuses on the means of acquisition of the information and
the content of the speech, not on the plaintiff's status. The Court has
held that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about
a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitu-
tionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to fur-
ther a state interest of the highest order."44 These cases have
asserted strong privacy interests: the anonymity of juvenile accused,4 5
the anonymity of rape victims, 46 and the confidentiality of a prelimi-
40. So named for its articulation in Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979). Ironically, while the holding in Daily Mail has evolved into the control-
ling test in cases of conflict between privacy and press freedom, the Daily Mail
Court claimed it was not deciding this question, asserting that "there is no issue
here of privacy." Id. at 105.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1976).
42. Id.
43. The five cases, listed in the order they reached the Court, are Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma
County District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979); and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
44. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103.
45. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (holding unconstitutional a state statute which made it a
crime to publish the name of a juvenile offender without the written approval of
the juvenile court); Okla. Publ'g Co., 430 U.S. 308 (striking down as violative of
the First Amendment a court order barring the publication of a juvenile accused's
name and photograph obtained in open court).
46. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. 524 (overturning a jury verdict against the press for the reve-
lation of a rape victim's name in violation of a Florida statute, where the newspa-
per obtained the information from publicly released police records); Cox Broad.
Corp., 420 U.S. 469 (holding that there could be no recovery in tort for the publi-
cation of a rape victim's name where that name had been obtained from public
records, despite a state statute which criminalized publication).
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nary investigation into judicial misconduct.47 Yet in each case, the
Court held that the revelation of the true private information was pro-
tected speech since it was lawfully acquired and concerned a matter of
public significance.4 S Thus, in disclosure of true private fact cases, the
Daily Mail test dictates that constitutional protection turns on
whether the speech is on a matter of public.concern (as well as the
means of acquisition),49 and not on whether the plaintiff is a private
or public person. 50
In sum, the Court has considered the constitutionality of two pri-
vacy torts, false light and disclosure of true private facts, and each
time it has announced a test that turns on the content of the speech,
and not on the status of the plaintiff.
B. The Other Story-Public/Private Status as a Component
of the Common Law of Privacy
Although the public figure doctrine has never been expressly
adopted by the Court as part of its constitutional analysis of privacy
cases, a plaintiffs status as a public or private person has always
played a major role in the common law of privacy. Warren and Bran-
deis, who are credited with the creation of the privacy tort, drew a
distinction between public officials and private persons arguing that
public persons had less of a claim to privacy. 51 The authors asserted
that "[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter
which is of public or general interest."52 But, what constituted "public
interest" varied with whether the plaintiff was a private or public per-
47. Landmark Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (holding unconstitutional a Vir-
ginia statute that criminalized the publication of information about a confidential
judicial inquiry).
48. See supra note 40.
49. Scholars have disagreed on the relative importance of each of these two factors.
Compare, e.g., Patrick J. McNulty, The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There
Is Life After Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93, 115 (2001) (arguing that Florida
Star abandons a test based on content and focuses exclusively on how news is
obtained), with Note, Leading Cases, 115 HARv. L. REV. 306, 407 (2001) (sug-
gesting that after Bartnicki, whether the information "addresses a matter of pub-
lic concern-is now more important than how it was obtained").
50. This is not to suggest that the opinions do not refer to the public figure doctrine.
For instance, some of the cases summarize the Court's libel decisions, including
the distinction between public and private figures. See Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at
539-40; Landmark Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 838, 841; Cox Broad.
Corp., 420 U.S. at 489-91.
51. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193, 215 (1890). Warren and Brandeis seemed to equate public plaintiffs with
those who held or sought public office, id. at 215-16, although their proffered
definition, those "who, in varying degrees, have renounced the right to live their
lives screened from public observation," id. at 215, was considerably wider.
52. Id. at 214.
1212 [Vol. 83:1204
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son.5 3 Public figures, who "have renounced the right to live their lives
screened from public observation," 5 4 had a lesser claim to privacy,
since matters "which would in the ordinary individual" be private, in
public figures could become a "subject of legitimate interest to their
fellow citizens." 55 For example, "[pleculiarities of manner and person,
which in the ordinary individual should be free from comment, may
acquire a public importance, if found in a candidate for political of-
fice." 56 The authors acknowledged that this doctrine would require a
court to examine the "varying circumstances of each case" to assess
the propriety of publication, and admitted that this "unfortunately
renders such a doctrine not only more difficult in application, but also
to a certain extent uncertain in its operation."5 7
The public/private figure distinction was incorporated into the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts definition of the tort of publication of pri-
vate facts.58 The Restatement reiterated that what qualified as a
matter of public concern, thus exempt from liability, varied with the
plaintiffs status.59 Public figures could not complain about publicity
given to public activities (since these were not private facts), and,
Comment e suggested, even as to private matters, public figures had
less of a claim to tort protection: "the legitimate interest of the public
in [public figures] may extend beyond those matters which are them-
selves made public, and to some reasonable extent may include infor-
mation as to matters that would otherwise be private."6 0
53. Id.
54. Id. at 215.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 215-16.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmts. e, f, h (1976). It is not clear
whether the public/private person distinction is part of the common-law tort of
false light. See Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 373 (noting "disagreement among
[the] courts [as to] whether the newsworthiness of the subject matter or the
plaintiffs status as a public or a private figure should affect the availability of the
action").
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmts. e, f, h. Comment e defined a vol-
untary public figure as '[olne who voluntarily places himself in the public eye, by
engaging in public activities, or by assuming a prominent role in institutions or
activities having general economic, cultural, social or similar public interest, or
by submitting himself or his work for public judgment." Comment f recognizes
and defines involuntary public figures.
60. Id. cmt. e. Comment h repeats this distinction announcing that permissible pub-
licity of information concerning either voluntary or involuntary public figures is
not limited to the particular events that arouse the interest of the public. Id.
cmt. h. That interest, once aroused by the event, may legitimately extend, to
some reasonable degree, to further information concerning the individual and the
facts about them, which are not public and which, in the case of one who had not
become a public figure, would be regarded as an invasion of his purely private
life.
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The Restatement did recognize that public figures have some expec-
tation of privacy,6 1 but made clear that the scope of tort liability de-
pended on the plaintiffs status: "revelations that may properly be
made concerning a murderer or the President of the United States
would not be privileged if they were to be made concerning one who is
merely injured in an automobile accident."62
The public/private figure distinction continues to play an impor-
tant part in common-law analysis today. In assessing whether infor-
mation is "of legitimate concern" to the public (or, as some states
phrase it, is "newsworthy"), most state courts include consideration of
the plaintiffs status as a public or private figure.6 3 For instance, one
of the leading cases, Kapellas v. Kofman,64 enunciated a three-part
test for newsworthiness that considers the value to society of publish-
ing the fact, the depth of intrusion into a person's private affairs, and
the "extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of pub-
lic notoriety."6 5
In an interesting twist, many courts perceive this common-law
public figure rule as required by the constitutional protection afforded
by the First Amendment-even though the Supreme Court has never
adopted such a test.6 6
61. Id. (suggesting that even for public figures such as movie actresses "[t]here may
be some intimate details of her life, such as sexual relations, which even the ac-
tress is entitled to keep to herself").
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1969); Goodrich v. Water-
bury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1331 (Conn. 1982); Rawlins v. Hutch-
inson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 992-93 (Kan. 1975); Bilney v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 660 (Md. Spec. App. 1979); Wilson v. Grant, 687
A.2d 1009, 1015-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
64. 459 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1969).
65. Id. at 922. This test has been widely followed. See, e.g., Goodrich, 448 A.2d at
1331; Wilson, 687 A.2d at 1016. Other states simply adopt Comment h of the
Restatement, which suggested that public figures have a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy. See, e.g., Rawlins, 543 P.2d at 992-93; Bilney, 406 A.2d at 659. The Kapel-
las test was ostensibly reaffirmed by the California Supreme Court in Shulman v.
Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998), although much of the plu-
rality opinion focuses on a "logical nexus test" for involuntary public figures, id.
at 483-85, which the court claims is a "natural adaptation of Kapellas." Id. at
486 n.9. This has created confusion in California as to the continued authority of
the Kapellas factors. Compare Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp.
2d 1055, 1068-69 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (applying the Kapellas factors and citing to
Shulman), with Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., No. CV 98-0583 DPP
(CWx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786, at *24-25 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (applying the
logical nexus test articulated in Shulman and balancing "the depth of the intru-
sion against the relevance of the matters broadcast to matters of legitimate pub-
lic concern"). See also Gary L. Bostwick, The Newsworthiness Element: Shulman
v. Group W Prods., Inc. Muddies The Waters, 19 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 225
(1999) (critiquing Shulman).
66. See, e.g., Shulman, 955 P.2d at 479 (noting that the Supreme Court has given
little guidance on the constitutional limits on privacy actions, the California court
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C. The Third Strand-The Public Figure Doctrine and
Governmental Invasion of a Citizen's Right to
Informational Privacy
The final chapter in the story of public figures and privacy law is
the Court's 1977 decision in Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices.6 7 Nixon is not a privacy case in the same sense this Article has
been discussing it, which is a tort action against the press for speech
that invades privacy. Rather, in Nixon, the Court considered a chal-
lenge by former President Nixon to the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act, which authorized the government to take
possession of, sort (into public and private), and then selectively re-
lease Nixon's presidential papers and tape recordings.68 Nixon as-
serted that he had a constitutional right of informational privacy
against the government that was violated by its screening of his
papers. 69
The Court held that Nixon had a constitutional right to prevent
government disclosure of personal information, 70 but found, after bal-
refused to attempt to "rigorously separate the tort and constitutional issues"
presuming that they were "congruent"). See also Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371,
378 (Colo. 1997); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289,
300-01 (Iowa 1979); Wilson, 687 A.2d at 1015.
67. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
68. Id. at 433-34.
69. Id. at 455-65 (discussing the privacy challenge).
70. Id. at 465 (commenting that "appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his personal communications"). This constitutional right of privacy is a right only
against government disclosure of private information. To date, the Court has not
recognized a constitutional right of privacy against disclosure by the press or
other nongovernmental entities. See Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001
SuP. CT. REV. 139, 172 (observing that "freedom from governmental abridgement
is explicitly protected by the Constitution, and freedom of the press from nongov-
ernmental interference with privacy is not"); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People
from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1107 (2000).
Some scholars see the Bartnicki decision as potentially opening the door to
such a universal constitutional right to privacy, based either in a constitutional
privacy right per se or derived from a First Amendment right to private speech.
See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives From Prying Eyes: The Esca-
lating Conflict Between Constitutional Privacy and the Accountability Principle of
Democracy, 11 CommMLw CONSPECTUS 71, 96 (2003) (opining that Bartnicki "rec-
ognized for the first time a constitutional right of privacy concerning disclosure of
private information obtained from a non-governmental source"). However, most
commentators read the Bartnicki opinion as simply according privacy very great
weight, and not as recognizing privacy as a constitutional right. See, e.g., Fred H.
Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 41-42 (2002) (arguing that "[wihether the Consti-
tution protects individuals' interests in avoiding collection and use of information
about them by private-sector entities is a critical question, but Bartnicki is a slen-
der basis for such a claim. Whether the case will prove to mark the first step in
the beginning of a real change in the Court's thinking, or whether it is merely an
1215
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ancing numerous factors, that this privacy right was not violated by
the Act. For our purposes here, the most notable feature of the deci-
sion is the Court's repeated focus on Nixon's public figure status. The
Court began its privacy analysis by citing to its libel jurisprudence
and discussing whether, by entering public life, Nixon had "volunta-
rily surrendered the privacy secured by law for those who elect not to
place themselves in the public spot light."7' It concluded that even
public officials have some privacy rights against the government,
holding that "public officials, including the President, are not wholly
without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of per-
sonal life."72 The Court expressly included "public figure" status as
part of its multifactor balancing test to determine if there was a viola-
tion of this privacy right.73
The Court has not returned to the Nixon case, and it has failed to
explain the scope of this constitutional right against the government,
let alone how public figure status impacts this right.74 However,
Nixon stands for the proposition that, at least when the privacy claim
is the right to informational confidentiality against the government,
public figure status is part of the constitutional analysis. While this
does not support an argument that the Court will adopt public figure
status as part of the constitutional test for tort actions for invasion of
privacy, it does show that the Court has, in some contexts, treated
public figure status as relevant to privacy. 75
aberration, remains to be seen"); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Cell Phone
Decision: An Unusual Balancing Act by the Court, 667 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE
77, 119 (2001) (observing that Bartnicki "may become an important precedent for
treating privacy as having great constitutional weight"); Jennifer Nichole Hunt,
Bartnicki v. Vopper: Another Media Victory or Ominous Warning of a Potential
Change in Supreme Court First Amendment Jurisprudence?, 30 PEPP. L. REv.
367, 387 (2003) (noting that the majority opinion "gave the interest in protecting
privacy nearly the same amount of weight as it gave the freedom of the press").
71. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455.
72. Id. at 457.
73. Id. at 465 (listing factors to be considered as including "appellant's status as a
public figure").
74. The lower courts in attempting to apply Nixon have developed a mixed record on
the importance of public figure status in deciding these privacy claims. While
most Courts adopt a balancing approach, some include "public figure status" as a
factor to be balanced. Compare Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134-35 (5th
Cir. 1978) (finding public officials have a lesser interest in privacy because they
were elected officials), with United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (adopting a multifactor balancing test which does not in-
clude public figure status).
75. I am not arguing that the test for governmental invasion of citizen's constitu-
tional right to privacy should be identical to the First Amendment limits on tort
actions for invasion of privacy. Rather this Article makes a simpler point: that
the Court has, on occasion, treated public figure status as relevant to informa-
tional privacy, and, as discussed supra, has done so for precisely the reason it is
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This is the conflicted tale of the public figure doctrine in privacy
law prior to Bartnicki. The Court had seemingly rejected it as a com-
ponent of the test for constitutional protection in privacy tort cases,
electing instead to focus on the content of speech and, sometimes, the
means of acquisition. However, the common law of privacy had long
embraced a public/private figure distinction as part of tort law. More-
over, in its constitutional analysis of a different privacy conflict (the
government's release of private information), the Court had appar-
ently approved the use of public status as a component of constitu-
tional analysis.
IV. THE CONFLICT CONTINUES-BARTNICKI v. VOPPER
The Court's ambivalence as to whether a plaintiffs public/private
status has a role in privacy law was revealed in the three opinions in
Bartnicki v. Vopper.7 6 The majority, in an opinion by Justice Stevens,
applied the "Daily Mail" content-based test, eschewing any reference
to the plaintiffs' status. 77 The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that speech that invades privacy merits little, if
any, constitutional protection, and made only passing reference to the
plaintiffs' status. 78 However, the concurring opinion of Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, advocated a constitutional test
that expressly included analysis of the plaintiffs' public/private sta-
tus. 79 Each opinion is discussed separately following an outline of the
pertinent facts.
A. The Facts-Cell Phones, Wiretaps, and Exploding
Porches
The facts of Bartnicki are memorable. From 1992 through 1993,
the teachers' union and school board for Wyoming Valley West High
School were at logger heads.80 The "contentious" pay negotiations re-
ceived repeated press coverage.8 1 In May 1993, two of the union rep-
resentatives, plaintiffs Kane and Bartnicki, discussed union strategy
in light of the board's apparent intransigence.8 2 In the course of the
discussion, Kane said "[i]f they're not gonna move for three percent,
we're gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . [t]o blow off their
front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys.
used in libel law (that a public figure assumes the risk of a loss of privacy upon
entering the public sphere).
76. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
77. Id. at 527-28 (Stevens, J., opinion for the Court).
78. Id. at 541-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 535-41 (Breyer, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 518 (Stevens, J.).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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(PAUSES). Really, uh, really and truthfully because this is, you
know, this is bad news."8 3 This conversation would have probably re-
mained unknown and the case unlitigated if Bartnicki had not used
her car cell phone to call Kane and if an unknown person had not in-
tercepted and recorded the call.8 4
The unknown interceptor placed the tape of the call in the mailbox
of Jack Yocum, the head of a local taxpayers' organization which had
vociferously opposed to the union's demands.85 Yocum played the
tape for some members of the school board and then handed the tape
over to Vopper, a local radio commentator, whose previous broadcasts
had been critical of the union.8 6 Vopper broadcast the tape of the
Kane/Bartnicki conversation on the air.8 7 This broadcast triggered
extensive, and presumably critical, follow-up coverage in the local
press.8 8
Plaintiffs Kane and Bartnicki sued Yocum (the tax advocate who
found the tape),8 9 Vopper (the radio commentator) and the media
(that played or reported the content of the tape) in federal court.90
The plaintiffs' amended complaint sought damages for the illegal in-
terception of their phone call in violation of state and federal wiretap-
ping statutes. 9 1 Both statutes imposed fairly steep fines for each
violation.92 It is clear that the actual interceptor, the unknown person
who intercepted and taped the call, was liable-but no one was able to
identify, and thus sue, the interceptor. 93 Rather, the plaintiffs sought
to sue Yocum, Vopper, and the media for their later disclosure of the
content of the illegal interception.94
83. Id. at 518-19.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 519.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Yocum was added as a defendant in an amended complaint after discovery re-
vealed he was the source of the tape. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The federal act allowed actual damages or "statutory damages of whichever is the
greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000.". 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)
(2000), cited in Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 520 n.2. The Pennsylvania statute had a
lesser penalty ($100 a day or $1,000, but it also allowed punitive damages and
attorney fees). 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5725(a) (2000), cited in Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at
520 n.2.
93. 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(a) (2000). The Court, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 691 (1972), made clear that if the press itself engaged in wiretapping, it
would be "frivolous to assert. .. that the First Amendment" protected such con-
duct. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532 n.19.
94. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519-20 (describing the claims made in the amended
complaint).
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On its face, the federal wiretapping statute imposed liability on
any person who "intentionally discloses . . . to any other person the
contents of any ... electronic communication, knowing or having rea-
son to know that the information was obtained through the intercep-
tion of a . . . electronic communication." 95 As the case reached the
Court, the presumed facts revealed that the original interception of
the call was unlawful; that the defendants, "at a minimum . . . had
reason to know" the interception was unlawful; and that the defend-
ants had intentionally disclosed the content of the intercepted call to
others. 96 In short, the defendants had violated the federal statute and
the parallel state provision. 9 7 Thus, "[tihe only question [for the
Court was] whether the application of these statutes in such circum-
stances violates the First Amendment."98 A majority of six held that
it did, finding, in Justice Stevens's words, that "privacy concerns give
way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of pub-
lic importance."99
B. Justice Stevens's Opinion for the Court
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court, which garnered the votes of
Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer and O'Connor, l0 0 upheld
the right of the press (and citizens) to disclose the content of private
telephone conversations so long as they had no role in the illegal wire-
tap and the speech was on a matter of public concern.10 1 The opinion
had two notable features.
First, the opinion ascribed great importance, perhaps even consti-
tutional weight, to privacy. At the outset of his opinion, Justice Ste-
vens characterized the case as presenting "a conflict between interests
of the highest order: on the one hand, the interest in the full and free
dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the
other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more specifically,
in fostering private speech."l0 2 This emphasis on the importance of
privacy and the Court's characterization of privacy as including a
95. 18 U.S.C. 2511(1)(c) (2000), cited in Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 520 n.3.
96. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524-25 (setting out the factual assumptions on which the
Court based its decision).
97. Id. at 525.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 534. The majority of six consisted of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Kennedy,
Souter, Breyer, and O'Connor. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented. Id.
100. Three Justices-Ginsburg, Kennedy and Souter-joined Stevens's opinion with-
out qualification. As discussed below in section IV.C, Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice O'Connor, wrote a concurring opinion. Id.
101. Id. at 518.
102. Id.
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speech right have left scholars debating whether Bartnicki signals a
new era of heightened protection for privacy.1O3
While Justice Stevens's opinion was innovative in its description of
the privacy right, its solution to the speech/privacy conflict was not.
The majority opinion expressly adopted and applied the Daily Mail
rule10 4 -thus, constitutional protection turned on whether the infor-
mation was "lawfully obtained" and was a "matter of public signifi-
cance."10 5 The Court easily concluded that "the subject matter of the
conversation was a matter of public concern."' 0 6 While noting that a
protracted debate over teacher pay at a public high school, "may be
more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice
Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California," the Bartnicki
Court held that "it is no less worthy of constitutional protection."107
The issue of whether the information was lawfully obtained was
more controversial, but the Court, early in its opinion, made two find-
ings that allowed it to conclude that this requirement was met (while
considerably expanding the test for "lawfully obtained"). First, the
Court noted, unremarkably, that defendants played no role in the ac-
tual interception' 0 8-but the Court also found that the defendants'
"access to the information on the tapes was obtained lawfully, even
though the information itself was intercepted unlawfully by someone
else."10 9 The Court held that unless the media was tied to the illegal
interception, there could be no liability: "a stranger's illegal conduct
does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech
about a matter of public concern."11o
Having fairly rapidly concluded that the speech merited First
Amendment protection under Daily Mail, Justice Stevens spent the
majority of his Bartnicki opinion assessing the strength of the govern-
ment's interests, to see if they were of the "highest order" as de-
manded by the Daily Mail test. 1 ' Concluding that neither the
103. See supra note 70 (discussing the literature).
104. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28. The majority opinion makes clear that it is adopt-
ing the Daily Mail test but it has been the subject of scholarly criticism for its
lack of clarity on other vital issues, for instance the level of scrutiny to be ap-
plied. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 70, at 142 (critiquing Justice Stevens's opin-
ion for "notable elusiveness in discussing the governing legal standard").
105. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28.
106. Id. at 525. The Court focused on the subject matter of the speech, not the circum-
stances in which the conversation occurred, to determine that the conversation
was on a matter of public concern.
107. Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 525.
109. Id. The Court noted that no statute prohibited the receipt of illegally intercepted
information, just its further disclosure.
110. Id. at 535.
111. Id. (analyzing the government's asserted interests).
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interest in deterring wire taps,112 nor the interest in minimizing
harms to persons whose conversations had been illegally inter-
cepted,113 outweighed the interest in publishing true information on a
matter of public concern, the Court held that the First Amendment
barred recovery in this case.114
What is notable for the purposes of this Article is that the Court
seemed wedded to Daily Mail, and its public concern/lawful access test
in privacy cases."15 The Court's opinion in Bartnicki seemed to signal,
once again, that in privacy cases, the content of the speech and not the
status of the plaintiff was the key to constitutional protection. Justice
Stevens never mentioned the public figure doctrine,116 and the only
caveat in the opinion was his insistence that the Bartnicki Court was
only deciding the "narrow" issue presented by the facts1 7 and his ex-
press refusal to announce a general rule on whether there ever could
be liability for the publication of true facts.118
C. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justices Breyer and O'Connor in concurrence-a concurrence that
supplied the votes necessary to make a majority-took a radically dif-
ferent approach.11 9 Justice Breyer's relatively short opinion started
by emphasizing that he and Justice O'Connor viewed the majority's
decision as "a narrow holding limited to the special circumstances pre-
112. Id. at 529-32 (finding the interest plainly insufficient).
113. Id. at 532-34 (characterizing this interest as "considerably stronger," but ulti-
mately concluding that it must "give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance").
114. Id. at 534-35.
115. Id. at 527 (citing Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979)).
116. There is only one point in Justice Stevens's opinion that can be seen as referenc-
ing, even obliquely, the plaintiffs status. Id. at 534. After expressly adopting a
public concern test and quoting Warren and Brandeis for the proposition that
"'[tihe right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of
public or general interest,'" the Court uses language which seems to evoke the
assumption-of-the-risk rationale which, as we have seen, is usually tied to the
public figure doctrine. Id. (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890)). Thus, the Court comments
that: "One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attend-
ant loss of privacy." Id. The Court never develops this thought, never mentions
the public figure doctrine, and instead returns to the importance of open debate
on matters of public concern. Id.
117. Id. at 517 (labeling question presented as both "novel" and "narrow"), 528 (char-
acterizing the issue as a "narrower version of that still-open question").
118. Id. at 529 (commenting that "[o]ur refusal to construe the issue presented more
broadly is consistent with this Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically
whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First
Amendment").
119. Id. at 535-41 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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sent here," and opposed any reading of the case as implying "a signifi-
cantly broader constitutional immunity for the media."120
Justice Breyer then stressed the importance both he and Justice
O'Connor attached to the right of privacy. 121 Repeating the majority's
description of privacy as an interest of the "highest order,"12 2 Justice
Breyer described privacy as a "constitutional concern."123 Since the
case, in his eyes, involved "competing constitutional concerns,"1 24 he
argued that use of traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny was
"out of place."12 5 Instead, citing only to his own concurrences in prior
speech cases, Justice Breyer proposed that the constitutional test was
one of "proper fit:"126 that is "whether the statutes strike a reasonable
balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing conse-
quences." 127 Justice Breyer made clear that many statutes enacted to
protect privacy would pass this test,' 28 but held that the wiretapping
statutes at issue "do not reasonably reconcile the competing constitu-
tional objectives."129
In performing this reasonable fit analysis, Justice Breyer looked at
three factors: (1) the "lawful nature" of the press's behavior;13 0 (2) the
topic of the speech (a threat of violence to others);131 and (3) whether,
as "limited public figures," the plaintiffs had a "lesser interest in pri-
vacy."13 2 He concluded that, "[hiere, the speaker's legitimate privacy
expectations are unusually low, and the public interest in defeating
those expectations is unusually high," and "[g]iven these circum-
stances, along with the lawful nature of [the press's] behavior, the
120. Id. at 536.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 536 (citing to the Court at 518).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. He elaborated on the test explaining that we must ask if statutes "impose
restrictions on speech that are disproportionate when measured against their
corresponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind,
the importance and the extent of these benefits, as well as the need for the re-
strictions in order to secure those benefits?" Id.
128. Id. at 537-38 (commenting that '[als a general matter, despite the statutes' di-
rect restrictions on speech, the Federal Constitution must tolerate laws of this
kind because of the importance of these privacy and speech-related objectives").
129. Id. at 538. Justice Breyer argued that the wiretapping statutes enhanced speech
as the assurance of privacy "encourage[d] conversations that otherwise might not
take place." Id. at 537. They restricted speech by "directly, deliberately, and of
necessity" penalizing media publication. Id.
130. Id. at 540.
131. Id. at 539 (Justice Breyer noted that revelation of such violent threats would be
privileged at common law.).
132. Id. at 539-40.
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statutes' enforcement would disproportionately harm media
freedom."133
Thus, Justice Breyer approach was different from the Bartnicki
majority's in two ways. First, it advocated a case-by-case balancing
test for reasonable fit (rejecting strict scrutiny). Second, it included
the plaintiffs' status as a factor to be considered in this balance (trans-
forming the majority's Daily Mail test from a two- to three-factor test).
Justice Breyer did not discuss why public figure status should be
used in privacy cases; he simply asserted that it was relevant and
cited to libel law where, as we have seen, public figure status is a rec-
ognized ingredient. 134 Justice Breyer then held that, as union negoti-
ators in a controversial strike, the plaintiffs were "limited public
figures" because they had "voluntarily engaged in a public contro-
versy," and thus had "subjected themselves to somewhat greater pub-
lic scrutiny and had a lesser interest in privacy than an individual
engaged in purely private affairs."13 5 Justice Breyer made clear that
public figures do not lack any privacy interest, indeed he implied that
when the balance is altered and the publication is of private and inti-
mate facts (not a matter of public concern) even public plaintiffs
should be entitled to recover. 13 6
He concluded by again emphasizing that his and O'Connor's votes
should not be counted on in future privacy cases: "I consequently
agree with the Court's holding that the statutes as applied here vio-
late the Constitution, but I would not extend that holding beyond
these present circumstances."'13 7
D. The Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the dissenting opinion in Bart-
nicki and was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, made two main
points: he argued against the application of strict scrutiny and as-
serted that privacy was a vital interest deserving of protection.13s
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "strict scrutiny" was inappropri-
ate because the statutes enhanced rather than diminished free
speech, 139 were content neutral,140 and did not fall within the ambit
of the Daily Mail cases. 14 1 Having rejected strict scrutiny, the Bart-
nicki dissent would uphold the statutes because they "further [two]
133. Id. at 540.
134. Id. at 539-40.
135. Id. at 539.
136. Id. at 540.
137. Id. at 541.
138. Id. at 541-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 542.
140. Id. at 544-46.
141. Id. at 546-49.
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substantial government[ I interest[s]:"142 Congress's interest in deter-
ring the initial interception by making illegal the later disclosure of
intercepted calls (the "dry-up-the-market" theory),14 3 and Congress's
interest in protecting the "venerable right of privacy."'14 4
In the last three pages of his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-
cussed this right of privacy and argued that it encompassed a right to
private phone conversations: "the interest in individual privacy, at its
narrowest, must embrace the right to be free from surreptitious eaves-
dropping on, and involuntary broadcast of, our cellular telephone con-
versations."1 5 He pointed out that Warren and Brandeis viewed
privacy as essential to all individuals,146 that criminal law had long
protected the public's expectation that telephone conversations are
private, 14 7 that the First Amendment recognized a right not to
speak,148 and that the free speech of millions of cellular phone users
would be chilled by the Court's decision.149 In the dissenters' view,
when this important privacy interest was balanced against "a margi-
nal claim to speak freely," privacy, not speech, should win out.150
In extolling the importance of privacy, and criticizing the major-
ity's failure to protect it, Chief Justice Rehnquist made his sole refer-
ence to public figure status. He commented:
The Constitution should not protect the involuntary broadcast of personal con-
versations. Even where the communications involve public figures or concern
public matters, the conversations are nonetheless private and worthy of pro-
tection. Although public persons may have forgone the right to live their lives
screened from public scrutiny in some areas, it does not and should not follow
that they also have abandoned their right to have a private conversation with-
out fear of it being intentionally intercepted and knowingly disclosed.151
On one hand, this reference to public figures indicates that, when
it comes to the issue of the privacy of phone conversations, both the
content of the conversation and the public/private status of the
speaker were irrelevant to the dissent. Everyone (including both pub-
lic and private figures) enjoys the right to private conversation.
Under this reading, for the three dissenters, public figure status was
irrelevant.
142. Id. at 548-49.
143. Id. at 549-53. Ironically, Chief Justice Rehnquist, hardly known for his own def-
erence to Congress, faults the majority with not recognizing that Congress is a far
better factfinder than the judiciary. Id. at 549-50.
144. Id. at 553.
145. Id. at 555.
146. Id. at 553.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 553-54.
149. Id. at 554.
150. Id. at 555-56.
151. Id. at 554-55.
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But, on the other hand, Rehnquist's exact wording that while "pub-
lic persons may have forgone the right to live their lives screened from
public scrutiny in some areas," they have not "abandoned their right
to have a private conversation," 15 2 may indicate that for issues other
than private phone conversations, public figure status is relevant. For
each claimed privacy right, Chief Justice Rehnquist implied, we would
have to check to see if it had been abandoned by public figures. So,
while public figure status is irrelevant if the claimed privacy right is a
right to have a private phone conversations, it may be relevant to
other privacy claims.
E. In Summary
Bartnicki shows that the Court is deeply divided as to the role of
public figure analysis in privacy cases. Two current Justices-Breyer
and O'Connor-are now on the record as including public figure status
as part of the constitutional test in privacy cases, but for the other
four members of the majority, such status seems irrelevant (content
and means of acquisition under Daily Mail being the deciding factors).
For the three dissenters, while their commitment to greater protection
for privacy is clear, their attitude toward the general relevancy of pub-
lic figure status is not.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE IN
TORT ACTIONS FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY
What should we make of this conflicting tale of the relevance of
public figure status in privacy cases? And, more importantly, what is
the future of the public figure doctrine in constitutional privacy
law?153
A. A Content-Only Test Holds On?
The first possibility is that the public figure doctrine remains ex-
iled from privacy cases. As documented above, none of the Court's key
privacy tort cases-neither the Time, Inc. line nor the Daily Mail
line-uses a public figure test, instead focusing on content.' 5 4 This
152. Id.
153. This Part discusses possible tests to determine the constitutionality of the tort
actions for invasion of privacy (false light and disclosure of private facts) when
they conflict with the free speech rights of the press. It does not offer a test for
governmental invasions of citizens' privacy, where a very different constitutional
balance may well be drawn. In such cases, the government possesses no constitu-
tional right to free speech, and indeed it is the plaintiff who asserts a constitu-
tional right to stop government speech on matters deemed private. In media
cases, by contrast, the First Amendment accords a constitutional right to speak.
Thus, a very different balance is likely to be drawn in these two sets of cases.
154. See supra section III.A.
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position is supported by the Court's majority opinion in Bartnicki,
which uses means of acquisition and matter of public concern as the
keys to constitutional protection.155 However, a future without some
public figure analysis seems unlikely for three reasons: the weakness
of the above-cited precedent, the policy justifications supporting the
inclusion of a public figure analysis, and the votes on the current
Court.
The first reason it is unlikely that a content-only test will prevail is
that the authority supporting it is weak. As discussed in section III.A,
supra, Time, Inc., was decided before the public figure doctrine was
fully articulated, and its general applicability is at least open to ques-
tion after Cantrell.156 Some courts read this ambiguous precedent as
suggesting that the public figure doctrine is part of the constitutional
analysis at least in false light privacy cases.157
The Daily Mail line of cases, applied to the public disclosure of true
facts tort, is equally ambiguous. The Court does not expressly reject a
public figure rule in any of these cases.158 Moreover, the opinions in
these cases, although adopting a content-based test, often refer to con-
stitutional libel law and discuss private/public figure status.15 9 Thus,
they are weak authority for the position that public figure status is
incompatible with, or alien to, privacy law.
This precedent's weakness is magnified by the express and re-
peated refusal of the Court to announce a general rule for privacy. In
both Time, Inc., 160 and in its Daily Mail cases, the Court has refused
to adopt a general privacy rule, simply announcing a rule for the case
before it.161 Thus, the precedent, while never adopting a public figure
test, also has never rejected it and indeed has left the door open.
Second, an analysis of the justification offered by the Court to sup-
port use the public figure doctrine in libel law makes its adoption in
privacy law seem likely. As discussed in Part II, supra, in libel law
155. 532 U.S. 514.
156. See supra section III.A for a discussion of the continued validity of Time, Inc.'s
holding post-Gertz.
157. See supra section III.A.
158. In most of the cases the plaintiffs were private figures (rape victims named in
governmental records and juvenile accused), and the Court was not called on to
address how public figures would be treated. The exceptions are Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 543 (where the plaintiffs were union representatives, and in Justice
Breyer's eyes, public figures) and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 829 (1978) (where the plaintiff, a state court judge, was a public
official).
159. See supra notes 34, 50 (detailing the discussion of public figures in the Daily Mail
line of case).
160. 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967) (declining to announce a rule going beyond the facts
before it).
161. See, e.g., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528-29; Fla. Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524, 532-33
(1989); Landmark Communications, 435 U.S. at 838.
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the most important rationale offered by the Court for its public figure
doctrine is that public plaintiffs are less deserving of recovery because
they assume the risk of adverse publicity.' 62
This same rationale has been frequently proffered by the Court
when discussing privacy. For instance, in Time, Inc., the Court left
open the possibility that public and private figures in privacy cases
would receive differing treatment because of their differing degrees of
self-help and assumption of the risk.163 Justice Breyer in his Bart-
nicki concurrence, also proffers the assumption-of-the-risk rationale
as supporting the use of a public figure test in privacy cases: charac-
terizing the plaintiffs' "legitimate privacy expectations as unusually
low,"1 6 4 he notes that, as union negotiators, they "voluntarily engaged
in a public controversy .. . [and] thereby subjected themselves to
somewhat greater public scrutiny and had a lesser interest in privacy
than an individual engaged in purely private affairs."16 5
162. See supra Part II (discussing the public figure doctrine in libel law). The Court
saw self-help as of lesser importance. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
344 (1974).
163. 385 U.S. at 390-91. The same concept, that public figures assume the risk and so
have a lesser privacy interest, is found in tort law. As several courts have put it,
"[a] person who by his accomplishments, fame or mode of life, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings,
affairs or character, is said to become a public personage, and thereby relin-
quishes a part of his right of privacy." Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543
P.2d 988, 993 (Kan. 1975) (quoting prior cases). See also Kapellas v. Kofman,
459 P.2d 912, 923 (1969) (commenting that "[t]hose who seek elected public posi-
tion realize that in so doing they subject themselves, and those closely related to
them, to a searching beam of public interest and attention"); Goodrich v. Water-
bury Republican-Am. Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1331 (Conn. 1982) (holding that a pub-
lic figure had a lesser privacy interest because he "voluntarily injected himself
into the public eye"); Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 660
(Md. 1979) (holding that basketball players "[h]aving sought and basked in the
limelight, by virtue of their membership of the team, will not be heard to com-
plain when the light focuses on their imminent withdrawal from the team").
One who voluntarily places himself in the public eye... cannot complain
when he is given publicity that he has sought. In such a case . . .the
legitimate interest of the pubic in the individual may extend beyond
those matters which are themselves made public, and to some reasona-
ble extent may include information as to matters that would otherwise
be private.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (1976).
The Court also expressly adopted the assumption-of-the-risk rationale in
Nixon. The Court started its privacy discussion by noting that Nixon "concedes
that when he entered public life he voluntarily surrendered the privacy secured
by law for those who elect not to place themselves in the public spot light." Nixon
v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455 (1977).
164. 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 539 (citing to libel case law).
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We may question the validity of the Court's entire assumption-of-
the-risk rationale,166 but, if we are willing to accept it in libel cases, it
seems equally plausible in privacy cases. If anything, it seems more
plausible to assert that public figures expect a loss of privacy when
they enter public life, than that they expect negligently false reports.
In the aftermath of the Clinton-Lewinsky saga, at least one commen-
tator has concluded that public figures should have no expectation of
privacy and should "act on the assumption that every aspect of their
lives may become widely known."16 7 In sum, the primary reason of-
fered by the Court to explain its incorporation of public figure status
in constitutional libel law seems to support, with equal if not greater
force, the inclusion of this doctrine in privacy cases.
Finally, adoption of a public figure doctrine in privacy cases seems
likely because of the current votes on the Supreme Court. Bartnicki
reveals that, on the current Supreme Court, there are only four votes
for a content-only test (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter and Gins-
burg).168 Justices Breyer and O'Connor (who made up the vital fifth
and sixth votes of the majority), advocate the incorporation of public
figure status.16 9 The three votes in dissent (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas) wish little, if any, limitations on ac-
tions for invasion of privacy and are at least open to the use of public
figure status in privacy cases. 170 If the Court were to face a claim by a
private figure based on publication of private facts, Justices Breyer
and O'Connor would presumably combine with the three votes in dis-
sent, to create a new majority on the Court.171 This majority would
166. For an examination of the assumption-of-the-risk rationale, see Gilles, supra note
13.
167. William A. Glaston, The Limits of Privacy: Culture, Law and Public Office, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1999) (opining that "for the foreseeable future,
candidates and public officials must act on the assumption that every aspect of
their lives may become widely known"). See also Anita L. Allen, Privacy and the
Public Official: Talking About Sex as a Dilemma for Democracy, 67 GEo. WAH.
L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1999) (noting, and lamenting, that Americans, and in particu-
lar public officials, have a diminished expectation of privacy); Shaun B. Spencer,
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843,
874-77 (2002) (observing that public officials have a decreased expectation of pri-
vacy and arguing that, therefore, an expectations-based test should be rejected);
McNulty, supra note 49, at 135 (commenting that "current community mores dic-
tate that there is very little privacy left for public figures.").
168. See supra section IV.B for a discussion of the majority opinion.
169. See supra section IV.C for a discussion of the concurrence.
170. See supra section IV.D for a discussion of the dissent.
171. See supra section IV.B for a discussion of the majority opinion. The likelihood
that Justices Breyer and O'Connor would vote with the Bartnicki dissenters in a
private figure case, is evidenced by the warning at the outset and the end of their
concurrence that the majority opinion must not be read to imply broader immu-
nity for the press beyond the facts of the case, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,
536-37, 541 (2001); the indication that many other statutes protecting privacy
would be constitutional and the legislatures should not be unduly restricted in
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seemingly vote for recovery by private persons, making the public/pri-
vate status the key to recovery in privacy cases. 172 In short, because
the two swing votes (essential to form a majority) see the distinction
as important, the public/private figure is likely to become part of con-
stitutional privacy law.
B. What Should a Public Figure Test Look Like in Tort
Actions for Invasion of Privacy?
Having concluded that it is likely that the Court will incorporate
some form of public figure doctrine into constitutional privacy law, the
remainder of this Article will argue that the form of analysis advo-
cated by Justice Breyer should be rejected and an alternative public
figure analysis, based on definitional balancing, should be adopted.17 3
their efforts to protect privacy, id. at 537-38, 541; and finally the constitutional
weight that the opinion gives to privacy, id. at 536-37.
Other scholars have pointed out that there may now be a majority of votes on
the Supreme Court in favor of protecting privacy. See, e.g., Doff, supra note 70,
at 119 (opining that "in some future case," the interest at stake "may well tip the
balance in the other direction"); Gerwitz, supra note 70, at 139, 141 (observing
that "[wihen read alongside the opinion of the three dissenters, who thought the
media should lose this case, the Breyer opinion makes clear that a majority of the
Court is prepared to uphold significant restrictions on the media in order to pro-
tect privacy"); Halstuk, supra note 70, at 91 (opining that Breyer and O'Connor
'could easily cast their key votes with Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, forming a
new majority in the future"); Hunt, supra note 70, at 386 (noting that Breyer and
O'Connor might well join the dissent to form a new majority who would impose
liability on the media); Richard D. Shoop, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 449, 464 (2002) (opining that if Justice Stevens had not written so
narrow a ruling, Justices Breyer and O'Connor could well have voted with the
dissent, creating a new majority).
172. Indeed, given the express refusal of even Justice Stevens to rule on how a private
matters case would come out, and his repeated description of privacy as an "im-
portant interest," there may be nine votes on the Court to allow liability for publi-
cation of a matter of private concern about a private person. See Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 532-33. This has led some scholars to debate whether privacy is close to
being recognized as a constitutional right. See supra note 70 (summarizing con-
flicting positions).
173. The distinction between "ad hoc balancing" and "definitional balancing" was first
offered by Professor Nimmer. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right To Speak from
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Pri-
vacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 942 (1968). While "ad hoc balancing" weighs the com-
peting interest anew in each and every case, in "definitional balancing" the Court
weighs the competing interests for a whole class of cases and announces a sub-
stantive constitutional rule to be applied to all cases within that class. Id.; see
also John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, 105-16 (1980) (discussing balancing
approaches); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 447-54 (1980) (discussing the Burger Court's use of
both ad hoc and definitional balancing ). Some critiques have charged that both
types of balancing are flawed. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 948 (1987).
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1. Examining Justice Breyer's Approach
a. Another Look at the Public Figure Analysis of Justice
Breyer
A review of the "public figure" analysis advocated in Justice
Breyer's concurrence reveals that it is strikingly similar to the ap-
proaches already at play in Nixon and at common law. First, the pub-
lic figure analysis adopted in each of these areas calls for multifactor
balancing, with public figure status being one of the factors. Thus, in
Nixon, the Court looked at a panoply of factors to determine whether
the former President's privacy right had been violated, including con-
sideration of his public figure status, his expectation of privacy in the
material, the public interest in the information, and the measures
taken to keep the information secret. 174 This same ad hoc, mul-
Balancing itself is usually contrasted with a categorical approach when the
Court, rather than balancing competing interests, simply classifies areas of
speech as protected or unprotected. Some categorical approaches are absolute
(speech is either absolutely protected or not protected at all) but other categorical
approaches admit of varying levels of protection. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra, at
943-45 (outlining forms of balancing); Nimmer, supra, at 935-42 (discussing the
three principal approaches of absolutism, ad hoc balancing and definitional bal-
ancing); Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of
Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 671-75 (1983) (providing detailed definitions of
each methodology).
This Article accepts that the current Court is wedded to balancing, see infra
section V.C, but urges the adoption of the definitional balancing approach used in
libel law, over the ad hoc balancing approach seemingly proposed by Justice
Breyer. Id.
174. The Court in fact considered at least nine factors: the extent of intrusion into
Nixon's privacy; his status as a public figure; his expectation of privacy in the
materials in question; the importance of the public interest; the level of difficulty
involved in segregating private and public documents; the Act's sensitivity to pri-
vacy interests; the measures taken to keep the materials private, including the
unblemished record of the archivists; and the likelihood that further regulations
would be promulgated to protect privacy. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 465 (1977) (summarizing the factors the Court considered in concluding
there was no privacy violation).
The lower courts have also followed this multifactored balancing approach.
Recognizing the balancing test asserted in Nixon, the Second Circuit has held
that using a balancing approach is the appropriate standard of review when con-
sidering the privacy of personal matters. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d
1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983). For further discussion, see also Plante v. Gonzalez, 575
F.2d 1119, 1134-36, (5th Cir. 1978) (adopting a balancing approach but stating
that Nixon provides little guidance in public disclosure cases); Fadjo v. Coon, 633
F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing Nixon and maintaining that a balanc-
ing approach is appropriate as an intermediate standard of review); Fraternal
Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying a mul-
tifactored balancing test comprised of factors other than those articulated in
Nixon); Slevin v. City of New York, 551 F. Supp 917, 930-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (cit-
ing to Nixon and stating that most lower courts have applied a balancing
approach).
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tifactor balancing approach is often present at common law: one prev-
alent approach determines whether a report is newsworthy by
balancing the value of the information to society, the depth of intru-
sion into a person's private affairs, and the extent to which the plain-
tiff voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety.' 7 5 Justice
Breyer's opinion in Bartnicki recommends that the same type of mul-
tifactor approach be adopted in constitutional law. 176 He advocates
balancing the speakers' "legitimate privacy expectations," "the public
interest" in the subject matter, and "the lawful nature" of the defen-
dant's conduct to see if they are reasonable.17 7 Under such an ap-
proach, public/private figure status is, as one state court explained,
"not determinative, but only one of a variety of factors to be
weighed."' 7 8
The second notable trait in these three areas is that, while the fac-
tors vary, all three include not just the plaintiffs public status, but
also whether the information is a matter is of public concern.1 79 Both
the plaintiffs status and the content of the speech are factors to be
balanced in each of these tests.
Finally, Justice Breyer's approach, just like the Court's approach
in Nixon and the common law's test, is an individualized, ad hoc, bal-
ancing test.18 0 Thus in Nixon, the Court refused to consider the claim
"in the abstract,"' 8 ' instead insisting that the issues must be reviewed
"in context."' 8 2 This same ad hoc balancing is present at common
law.' 8 3 The test advocated by Justice Breyer is also an individualized,
175. See, e.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912,922 (Cal. 1969). Interestingly, for the
reasons set out later in this Article, some courts, including the California Su-
preme Court (which created the Kapellas test), have had concerns with an ad hoc
balancing test and have sought to frame a more categorical approach. See Shul-
man v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485-86 (Cal. 1998) (endorsing the
Kapellas test, but concerned with fact-dependent balancing of First Amendment
rights attempting to incorporate a relevancy analysis, which it argues will reduce
ad hoc balancing). For a discussion of Shulman, see Bostwick, supra note 65, at
225.
176. See supra section IV.C discussing the concurrence.
177. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540.
178. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 486 n.9.
179. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 465 (including public figure status and importance of pub-
lic interest in the material at issue); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (examining both whether the matter was of public concern and the
plaintiffs public figure status); Kapellas, 459 P.2d at 922 (including the value to
society of the facts to be published and whether the person was in a position of
public notoriety).
180. For the classic distinction between ad hoc balancing and definitional balancing,
see supra note 173.
181. 433 U.S. at 458.
182. Id. at 465.
183. See, e.g., Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652, 660 (Md. Spec.
App. 1979) (noting that the Restatement's test is "reasonableness under the facts
presented"); see also Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485, 486 (endorsing the Kapellas test,
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case-by-case balancing test.1 8 4 Breyer expressly cautions the Court to
"avoid adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional rules,"15 and in-
sists on an ad hoc inquiry as to whether "looked at more specifically,
the statutes, as applied in these circumstances" were reasonable.18 6
Thus Justice Breyer's model seems to share several key character-
istics of the public figure analysis already at play in privacy law prior
to Bartnicki. These three distinct characteristics are that it is a mul-
tifactored test; that both plaintiff's status and the content of the
speech are factors; and that the balancing is done ad hoc, case by
case. 187
b. Justice Breyer's Public Figure Doctrine Is Not the Public
Figure Doctrine of Constitutional Libel Law
When we compare the public figure test described above to the doc-
trine created in libel law, it is apparent that we have two very differ-
ent approaches, masquerading under the same name. Let us return to
libel law. The proponents of the public figure test in libel saw two
main benefits for the public figure test (over the competing pubic con-
cern test). First, a public figure test avoided the significant difficulties
the Court saw with adopting a test that required the Court to desig-
nate which topics were of interest to the public.188 Indeed, these Jus-
tices questioned not just the competency of the Court to offer a
workable definition of matters of public concern, but also the constitu-
but concerned with its fact-dependent, ad hoc balancing of First Amendment
rights).
184. Other scholars have noted that Breyer's approach is a case-by-case balancing ap-
proach. See Dorf, supra note 70, at 116; James M. Hilmert, Note, The Supreme
Court Takes on the First Amendment Privacy Conflict and Stumbles: Bartnicki v.
Vopper, the Wiretapping Act, and the Notion of Unlawfully Obtained Information,
77 IND. L.J. 639, 655 (2002) (characterizing Justice's Breyer's test as "an amor-
phous ad hoc balancing test"); Note, supra note 49, at 410 (observing that Breyer
"would balance privacy and free speech interests case by case").
185. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001).
186. Id. at 538.
187. Some scholars have suggested ad hoc weighing approaches similar to that advo-
cated by Justice Breyer. See, e.g., Matthew J. Coleman, The "Ultimate Question".
A Limited Argument for Trafficking in Stolen Speech, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 559, 609
(2002) (advocating that the level of free speech protection accorded in each case
be determined by evaluating a series of factors including the nature of the speech
and the plaintiffs status).
188. For instance, in dissent in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971),
Justice Marshall attacked Justice Brennan's proposed public interest test, be-
cause "[c]ourts, including this one, are not anointed with any extraordinary pre-
science," and asked whether "courts are [to] simply take a poll to determine
whether a substantial portion of the population is interested or concerned in a
subject" or whether courts are to "somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a
particular event or subject." Id. at 79. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (Powell, J.) (offering the same reasons for rejecting Rosen-
bloom's public concern test).
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tional wisdom of the Court taking on such a role, since requiring judi-
cial approval of topics would endanger freedom of speech.189 In
contrast, the Gertz Court saw relatively few difficulties in defining
public and private plaintiffs, commenting that "we have no difficulty
in distinguishing among defamation plaintiffs."'190 Thus in libel law,
when the Court adopted the public figure doctrine, it also rejected the
public concern test.19 1
The Court also offered a second reason for the adoption of the pub-
lic figure test: it avoided the need for case-by-case balancing, and in-
stead offered a definitional balancing approach.19 2 As the Court put
it: "Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake in
each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of
general application."'19 3 Thus in libel law, the public figure doctrine
requires the Court to determine to which category a plaintiff belongs,
and thereby, what level of fault the plaintiff must prove.' 9 4 It does
not call for an individualized, multifactor balancing test, and indeed
such a test was specifically rejected by the Court.195
In sum, libel law's public figure doctrine was adopted to minimize
the role of a public concern test and to achieve definitional, not ad hoc,
balancing. Yet, as advocated by Justice Breyer (and indeed as em-
ployed in Nixon and at common law), the public figure doctrine works
in the opposite way-public figure and public concern are combined as
factors to be balanced in an ad hoc weighing of multiple factors. Far
from importing libel's public figure doctrine, what is evolving in pri-
vacy law is a very different animal.
2. Outlining a "Libel-Like" Public Figure Doctrine for Privacy
Cases
What would a constitutional test for privacy look like if it incorpo-
rated libel's public figure doctrine? First, such an approach would
mandate that the courts always, as a first step, ascertain the plain-
tiffs status. The Court would then have to devise general rules detail-
ing the proof required for each category of plaintiffs, depending on the
Court's balancing of the interest of the states in protecting that cate-
189. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (Powell, J.) (observing that "[wie doubt the wisdom of com-
mitting this task to the conscience of judges"); Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (commenting that "[the danger such a doctrine portends for
freedom of the press seems apparent").
190. 418 U.S. at 344.
191. Over the years since Gertz, whether a matter is of public concern has crept back
into some areas of constitutional libel law. See supra note 12.
192. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44. For the classic distinction between ad hoc balancing
and definitional balancing, see supra note 173.
193. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44.
194. Id. at 347-48.
195. Id. at 343-44.
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gory of plaintiffs and the free speech interest.196 In false light cases,
the actual malice test and similar fault rules created in constitutional
libel law could be transposed into privacy law, since both torts seek to
punish false speech. 19 7 However, where the privacy action is for pub-
lic disclosure of true private facts, the offending speech is true and the
libel rules which focus on the press's knowledge of falsity cannot be
applied. 198
Yet it is possible to imagine a scheme, based on definitional balanc-
ing, for the disclosure tort and similar statutory actions. For instance,
the Court could hold that public figures could never recover for publi-
cation of true private facts (concluding that states' lesser interest in
providing a remedy for those who have assumed the risk of such pub-
licity is outweighed by the interest of the public in true information
about such public persons). For private persons, where the matter is
of public concern, the Court could continue to hold that, upon proof
that the information is of public concern and that it was lawfully ac-
quired, there can be no liability for publication in the absence of a
governmental interest of the "highest order" (i.e., the Daily Mail
test).199 This leaves the strongest case for recovery: private person/
private facts. Here, given the vote in Bartnicki, a majority of the
196. In other words, the Court would engage in "definitional balancing," weighing the
competing interests in each class of cases (public figure/public facts cases; public
figure/private facts cases; private figure/public facts cases; and private figure/pri-
vate facts cases) and announcing substantive rules to be applied to all cases fall-
ing within each class. See supra note 173, defining definitional balancing.
197. In constitutional libel law, if a plaintiff is determined to be a public figure or a
private figure and the speech is on a matter of public concern, the plaintiff must
prove falsity and a heightened fault standard (actual malice or negligence respec-
tively) that focuses on the press's attitude toward the truth. See Gertz, 418 U.S.
323. Such heightened fault standards would work in false light privacy cases,
since falsity must be proven, and thus the Court could, as it did in Time, Inc.,
transplant the actual malice test. Time, Inc., v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967).
The Court, of course, could find a different balance of interests and therefore
adopt a different set of liability rules in false light cases. As Professor Zimmer-
man has pointed out, though libel and false light are similar, they are not identi-
cal. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 393-95. In particular, false light does not
require the plaintiff to suffer reputational harm, and thus false light plaintiffs
may have less of an interest in recovery-suggesting that a more pro-press set of
substantive rules should be adopted. Id. at 435-51 (arguing that the false light
rules are inadequate to address the free speech problems created by the false
light tort).
198. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (defining the disclosure of private
facts tort).
199. Such a scheme would thus leave unaltered the results in the leading disclosure
cases: Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Oklahoma Publish-
ing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); and Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524(1989). Landmark Communications Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), which
concerned a public official, would not change in result, but would be simpler since
the scheme above would bar automatically any recovery.
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Court may well conclude that there is a low First Amendment interest
in facts of no public concern (even though true), a high state interest
in giving a remedy to a private person, and thus recovery should be
allowed, perhaps with some limitation on damages. 20 0
It is not the goal of this Article to advocate one set of substantive
constitutional rules versus another. It is sufficient for this piece to
point out that the adoption of a definitional balancing approach, simi-
lar to that employed in libel law, would lead to a very different "public
figure" doctrine than that advocated by Justice Breyer.
C. Why Libel's Definitional Approach Is Better than Justice
Breyer's Proposal
This section argues that the Court should adopt a definitional,
rather than ad hoc, balancing approach. Some justices, most notably
Justice Black, have objected to any balancing, arguing instead for ab-
solute rules, on the grounds that balancing undervalues free speech
interests and is contrary to the text of the First Amendment. 201 Yet
his position never won out in the libel cases,2 02 and the Court has
openly acknowledged that it is engaged in balancing.20 3 The Court
today seems firmly committed to balancing. 20 4
200. It is not my position that allowing a private figure/private concern action ade-
quately protects free speech values, given that the State is seeking to penalize
true speech. See Susan M. Gilles, All Truths Are Equal, But Are Some Truths
More Equal Than Others?, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 725 (1991) (advocating that
there should be no liability where speech is true). My point is simply that, count-
ing the votes in Bartnicki, there seem to be five, perhaps even nine, votes on the
current Court for allowing recovery for a private person suing for publication of
true private facts. See supra section V.A for a discussion of the votes in Bart-
nicki. Since the Court is likely to allow such an action, this Article suggests how
to best craft constitutional limitations on such actions so as to protect free speech.
201. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. at 61-63 (Black, J., dissenting).
For a spirited argument that balancing should be widely rejected, see Aleinikoff,
supra note 173.
202. For his continued advocacy of this position, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (concurring and dissenting); Time, Inc., 385 U.S.
at 398 (Black, J., concurring).
203. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (seeking the "proper accommodation" between
free speech and reputational interest); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1987) (characterizing the "approach ap-
proved in Gertz" as "balanc[ing] the State's interest in compensating private
individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest
in protecting this type of expression."). As one commentator has observed, while
New York Times itself did not seem to engage in balancing, from Gertz on, the
Court has consistently employed definitional balancing in libel cases. See,
Aleinikoff, supra note 173, at 1001 (arguing that New York Times did not employ
balancing), 977 (noting that since Gertz, the Court has weighed First Amendment
interests against reputational interest in libel cases).
204. Indeed, one commentator has concluded that "[clonstitutional law has entered
the age of balancing." See Aleinikoff, supra note 173, at 972. Justice Stevens,
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The distinction between libel law's approach and Justice Breyer's
is not between balancing and no balancing, rather it is between defini-
tional balancing and case-by-case balancing. That is, the issue is
whether the Court (1) will perform a weighing for an entire category of
cases (e.g., public figures cases) and announce a rule to be followed in
all cases within that category or (2) reweigh the factors in every indi-
vidual case as Justice Breyer advocates.20 5
This dilemma is not a new one for the Court. As Justice Powell
pointed out thirty years ago in Gertz while facing this same choice in
libel law, "theoretically, of course the balance between the needs of the
press and the individual's claim to compensation ... might be struck
on a case-by-case basis."206 But he identified two drawbacks to a case-
by-case approach: it "would lead to unpredictable results and uncer-
tain expectations,"20 7 and it could "render [the Court's] duty to super-
vise the lower courts unmanageable."20 8 Concluding that "an ad hoc
resolution of the competing interests at stake in each particular case
is not feasible,"20 9 the Gertz Court instead elected to "lay down broad
rules of general application."210
These same objections apply with equal force to privacy cases. The
unpredictability and uncertainty feared by Justice Powell is well-illus-
trated by Justice Breyer's approach in Bartnicki. Although Justice
Breyer identifies multiple factors to be balanced, as several scholars
have noted, "precise weights are never assigned to any of the factors
S.. [nior are we even sure that the quantities being measured are
commensurate," or even how the absence of one factor, or the presence
of a new factor, would affect the result.21 1 Thus a lawyer, advising a
writing for the majority in Bartnicki, acknowledges that he was adopting a bal-
ancing approach: "[iun these cases, privacy concerns give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance." Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001). See Dorf, supra note 70, at 118 (commenting
that "in Bartnicki, none of the Justices objected to balancing"). C.f, Coleman,
supra note 187, at 582-83 (arguing that the majority is "drifting closer and closer
to a categorical test" and advocating a "pure balancing approach"). Professor
Dorf views both Justices Stevens and Breyer as engaged in balancing. See Dorf,
supra note 70, at 118. I would agree, but argue that while Breyer's is an ad hoc
approach, the majority engage in the definitional balancing (announcing a rule
for publication of matters of public concern, although not for matters of private
concern).
205. The distinction between "definitional" and "ad hoc" balancing was first proffered
by Professor Nimmer. See Nimmer, supra note 173.
206. 418 U.S. at 343.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 343-44.
211. See Dorf, supra note 70, at 116. See also Hilmert, supra note 184, at 659 (arguing
that "other than listing three factors, [Justice Breyer's test] left the lower federal
courts no reasonably applicable standard and consequently left the First Amend-
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media client who proposed to publish a true story concerning private
information about a public figure, would be reduced to opining that
maybe there would be liability.2 12 Such uncertainty of result is all the
more troubling, since, under the First Amendment, one of the Court's
acknowledged goals is to reduce the chilling effect that tort law has on
true speech.213 The more uncertain the law, the greater the fear of
potential liability, and the greater the chill on the speaker.2 14
In contrast, if the Court were to adopt a definitional balancing ap-
proach in privacy, as it has in libel law, greater clarity of advice can be
offered.2 15 For instance, presuming liability rules like those set out
above were adopted by the Court, a lawyer could advise a client that
since the subject of the story is a public figure, recovery will not be
permitted if the information is true. Or, if the potential plaintiff is a
private person and the story is on a matter of public concern, the law-
yer can advise that the press will have to prove the information was
legally obtained and is on a matter of public concern. It is true that
uncertainty remains (for instance will a court find the plaintiff a pub-
lic figure2 16 or conclude that the matter is of public concern?), 2 17 but
ment privacy doctrine in disarray"). For an argument that all balancing ap-
proaches suffer from "measurability" problems, see Aleinikoff, supra note 173, at
973-77.
212. One article suggests that Justice Breyer's approach is so "amorphous" that two
lower courts considering the same case "would probably arrive at two different
conclusions," Hilmert, supra note 184, at 656. See also Bostwick, supra note 65,
at 249-50 (illustrating how the ad hoc common-law test can come out either way
when applied to a hypothetical set of facts).
213. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254, 278 (1974) (stating that the
goal of the actual malice rule is to prevent the "pall of fear and timidity imposed
upon those who would give voice to public criticism," because in such "an atmos-
phere . ..First Amendment freedoms cannot survive."). See also Frederick
Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,"
58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
214. See Doff, supra note 70, at 115 (noting that uncertainty is especially problematic
in the First Amendment area because of the chilling effect); Nimmer, supra note
173, at 939 (noting that "[tihe absence of certainty in the law is always unfortu-
nate, but it is particularly pernicious where speech is concerned because it tends
to deter all but the most courageous (not necessarily the most rational) from en-
tering the market place of ideas").
215. Greater certainty is generally recognized as an advantage of definitional over ad
hoc balancing. See Aleinikoff, supra note 173, at 979 (arguing that "[any gain in
certainty it provides comes at the price of reduced coherence"); Nimmer, supra
note 173, at 939 (ad hoc balancing leads to uncertainty).
216. While numerous scholars have attacked the Court's public figure doctrine, I have
argued that, properly understood, it is a defensible doctrine. See Gilles, supra
note 13, at 233 n.8 (listing the articles condemning the public figure doctrine).
217. For criticism of the public concern doctrine as lacking clarity, see Cynthia L. Es-
tlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Volokh, supra note 70, at
1088-1106 (arguing that the public concern doctrine is theoretically unsound and
should be abandoned).
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the presence of rules permits a greater degree of predictability than an
individualized, ad hoc approach where each case is treated as unique.
Justice Powell's second objection, that an ad hoc approach makes
appellate review unmanageable, is a significant concern.2 18 If the
trial courts are to engage in ad hoc balancing, then, short of reviewing
each case to see if they agree, the appellate courts can have little role
in protecting free speech. 2 19 In contrast, libel law teaches that, under
a definitional balancing approach, the appellate courts play a consid-
erable role in preserving free speech. Studies have shown that appel-
late courts exercising independent review reverse, in whole or in part,
approximately seventy percent of pro-plaintiff libel judgments. 2 20
Another significant procedural protection would be lost if the Court
were to adopt an ad hoc approach: summary judgment. In libel law,
summary judgment is a powerful and relatively cheap device, that
eliminates a vast number of claims that cannot meet the constitu-
tional requirements laid out by the Court.2 2 1 Yet, if an ad hoc ap-
proach is adopted, its requirement of an individualized weighing of all
the facts makes summary judgment almost impossible to obtain. 222
In sum, Justice Breyer's approach increases the unpredictability
and uncertainty that constitutional law seeks to eradicate, and will
destroy the effectiveness of the procedural safeguards that a defini-
tional approach can provide. In addition, there are three distinct ad-
vantages to adopting a definitional, rather than ad hoc, approach to a
public figure doctrine in privacy cases. First, it would decrease the
confusion of litigants, lawyers and the courts if there were one, rather
than two, public figure doctrines in constitutional media law.223 Sec-
ondly, a majority on the current Court may well be comfortable with
218. Justice Powell opined that an ad hoc approach would "render [the Court's] duty
to supervise the lower courts unmanageable." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
219. Id. at 343 (pointing out that an "ad hoc resolution of... each particular case is
not feasible").
220. See Gilles, supra note 25, at 1777-79 (reporting on the statistical findings of the
Libel Defense Resource Center and other researchers).
221. Id. at 1774 (reporting that studies have consistently found that between seventy
and eighty percent of defense motions for summary judgment are granted).
222. Justice Breyer characterizes his test as asking if the "balance" drawn is "reasona-
ble" in light of the competing concerns. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536. Yet reasona-
bleness, the classic negligence standard, is almost always one for the jury and not
appropriate for summary judgment. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 148,
at 355 (observing that "[blecause part of the jury's role is to make normative deci-
sions or value judgments, courts do not normally grant summary judgment on
negligence issues, even if the facts are undisputed").
223. The ad hoc approach to public/private figures in common-law tort, discussed
supra section III.B, would perhaps remain, although the confusion of the state
courts as to whether the public figure doctrine is part of tort law or constitutional
law might lead state courts to simply follow any clear lead provided by the Su-
preme Court.
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such an approach. It is an approach the Court has lived with for over
fifty years in libel,224 and it is an approach that may meet the interest
of all three groups on the current Court. It goes some way, though not
as far as they would like, to increase protection of privacy that the
dissenters in Bartnicki demand. 225 It would include public figure
analysis, albeit in a different manner, as the concurrence demands. 226
And, in setting out at least some rules, it may appeal to the four voters
in the majority who adopted the Daily Mail test,22 7 especially if, as I
suggested supra, the Daily Mail test is adopted as one of the rules. 228
Finally, such an approach would not require a reversal of existing pre-
cedent. The Court could adopt such a public figure approach without
overturning its prior holdings in the privacy area.2 29
VI. CONCLUSION
This tale of the public figure doctrine and privacy law has no end-
ing; or at least, the Supreme Court has not written it yet. This Article
proposes that if the Court is, as I predict, going to incorporate some
form of a public figure test into privacy law, it should employ defini-
tional balancing as it has in libel law, and not its inferior cousin, the
ad hoc approach, advocated by Justice Breyer.
224. See supra Part II (discussing the public figure doctrine in libel law).
225. See supra section IV.D (discussing the dissent).
226. See supra section JV.C (discussing the concurrence).
227. See supra section IV.B (discussing the majority opinion).
228. See supra subsection V.B.2 (discussing a definitional balancing approach that in-
corporates the Daily Mail test).
229. As noted supra, the Court has never expressly rejected a "public figure" approach
and has always been careful to rule only on the facts before it, leaving the door
open to adopt a more generalized test. See supra section V.A (discussing the pri-
vacy precedent). Moreover, if the rules the Court adopts are those I suggest in
section V.B, supra, the result in none of its prior cases would need to be over-
ruled. See supra note 199, for a discussion of the relevant cases.
1239
